MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A PROTOCOL OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC PROVIDING FOR THE COLLECTION AND DISBURSEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE CUSTOMS REVENUES OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SIGNED ON FEBRUARY 4, 1905 To the Senate: I submit herewith a protocol concluded between the Dominican Republic and the United States. The conditions in the Republic of Santo Domingo have been growing steadily worse for many years. There have been many disturbances and revolu tions, and debts have been contracted beyond the power of the Republic to pay. Some of these debts were properly contracted and are held by those who have a legitimate right to their money. Others are without question improper or exorbitant, constitut ing claims which should never be paid in full and perhaps only to the extent of a very small portion of their nominal value. Certain foreign countries have long felt themselves aggrieved because of the non-payment of debts due their citizens. The only way by which foreign creditors could ever obtain from the Republic itself any guaranty of payment would be either by the acquisition of territory outright or temporarily, or else by taking possession of the custom-houses, which would of course in itself, in effect, be taking possession of a certain amount of territory. It has for some time been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe Doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which it con fers; and that the same statement applies to those who uphold the doctrine. It can not be too often and too emphatically asserted that the United States has not the slightest desire for territorial aggran dizement at the expense of any of its southern neigh bors, and will not treat the Monroe Doctrine as an excuse for such aggrandizement on its part. We do not propose to take any part of Santo Domingo, or exercise any other control over the island save what is necessary to its financial rehabilitation in connection with the collection of revenue, part of which will be turned over to the Government to meet the necessary expense of running it, and part of which will be distributed pro rata among the creditors of the Republic upon a basis of absolute equity. The justification for the United States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be found in the fact that it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors and yet to refuse, itself, to take any such steps. An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with American States, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of government or of the despoilment of their territory under any dis guise. But, short of this, when the question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a blockade, or bombardment, or the seizure of the custom-houses, and this means, as has been said above, what is in effect a possession, even though only a temporary possession, of terri tory. The United States then becomes a party in interest, because under the Monroe Doctrine it can not see any European power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these Republics ; and yet such seizure of territory, disguised or undis guised, may eventually offer the only way in which the power in question can collect any debts, unless there is interference on the part of the United States. One of the difficult and increasingly complicated problems, which often arise in Santo Domingo, grows out of the violations of contracts and con cessions, sometimes improvidently granted, with valuable privileges and exemptions stipulated for upon grossly inadequate considerations which were burdensome to the State, and which are not infre quently disregarded and violated by the governing authorities. Citizens of the United States and of other Governments holding these concessions and contracts appeal to their respective Governments for active protection and intervention. Except for arbi trary wrong, done or sanctioned by superior author ity, to persons or to vested property rights, the United States Government, following its traditional usage in such cases, aims to go no further than the mere use of its good offices, a measure which fre quently proves ineffective. On the other hand, there are Governments which do sometimes take energetic action for the protection of their subjects in the enforcement of merely contractual claims, and thereupon American concessionaries, supported by powerful influences, make loud appeal to the United States Government in similar cases for similar ac tion. They complain that in the actual posture of affairs their valuable properties are practically con fiscated, that American enterprise is paralyzed, and that unless they are fully protected even by the enforcement of their merely contractual rights, it means the abandonment to the subjects of other Governments of the interests of American trade and commerce through the sacrifice of their invest ments by excessive taxes imposed in violation of contract, and by other devices, and the sacrifice of the output of their mines and other industries, and even of their railway and shipping interests, which they have established in connection with the exploi tation of their concessions. Thus the attempted so lution of the complex problem by the ordinary meth ods of diplomacy reacts injuriously upon the United States Government itself, and in a measure para lyzes the action of the Executive in the direction of a sound and consistent policy. The United States Government is embarrassed in its efforts to foster American enterprise and the growth of our com merce through the cultivation of friendly relations with Santo Domingo, by the irritating effects on those relations, and the consequent injurious influ ence upon that commerce, of frequent interventions. As a method of solution of the complicated problem arbitration has become nugatory, inasmuch as, in the condition of its finances, an award against the Republic is worthless unless its payment is secured by the pledge of at least some portion of the customs revenues. This pledge is ineffectual without actual delivery over of the custom-houses to secure the ap propriation of the pledged revenues to the payment of the award. This situation again reacts injuri ously upon the relations of the United States with other nations. For when an award and such se curity are thus obtained, as in the case of the Santo Domingo Improvement Company, some foreign Gov ernment complains that the award conflicts with its rights, as a creditor, to some portion of these rev enues under an alleged prior pledge ; and still other Governments complain that an award in any consid erable sum, secured by pledges of the customs rev enues, is prejudicial to the payment of their equally meritorious claims out of the ordinary revenues; and thus controversies are begotten between the United States and other creditor nations because of the apparent sacrifice of some of their claims, which may be just or may be grossly exaggerated, but which the United States Government can not inquire into without giving grounds of offence to other friendly creditor nations. Still further illustrations might easily be furnished of the hopelessness of the present situation growing out of the social disorders and the bankrupt finances of the Dominican Repub lic, where for considerable periods during recent years the bonds of civil society have been practically dissolved. Under the accepted law of nations foreign Gov ernments are within their right, if they choose to exercise it, when they actively intervene in support of the contractual claims of their subjects. They sometimes exercise this power, and on account of commerical rivalries there is a growing tendency on the part of other Governments more and more to aid diplomatically in the enforcement of the claims of their subjects. In view of the dilemma in which the Government of the United States is thus placed, it must either adhere to its usual attitude of non intervention in such cases an attitude proper under normal conditions, but one which in this particular kind of case results to the disadvantage of its citi zens in comparison with those of other States or else it must, in order to be consistent in its policy, actively intervene to protect the contracts and con cessions of its citizens engaged in agriculture, com merce, and transportation in competition with the subjects and citizens of other States. This course would render the United States the insurer of all the speculative risks of its citizens in the public securities and franchises of Santo Domingo. Under the plan in the protocol herewith submitted to the Senate, ensuring a faithful collection and ap plication of the revenues to the specified objects, we are well assured that this difficult task can be ac complished with the friendly co-operation and good will of all the parties concerned, and to the great relief of the Dominican Republic. The conditions in the Dominican Republic not only constitute a menace to our relations with other foreign nations, but they also concern the prosperity of the people of the island, as well as the security of American interests, and they are intimately as sociated with the interests of the South Atlantic and Gulf States, the normal expansion of whose commerce lies in that direction. At one time, and that only a year ago, three revolutions were in progress in the island at the same time. It is impossible to state with anything like ap proximate accuracy the present population of the Dominican Republic. In the report of the Com mission appointed by President Grant in 1871, the population was estimated at not over 150,000 souls, but according to the Statesman s Yearbook for 1904, the estimated population in 1888 is given as 610,000. The Bureau of the American Republics considers this the best estimate of the present popu lation of the Republic. As shown by the unanimous report of the Grant Commission the public debt of the Dominican Republic, including claims, was $1,565,831.59/4. The total revenues were $772,684.75- The public indebtedness of the Dominican Republic, not including all claims, was on September 12 last, as the Department of State is advised, $32,280,000 ; the estimated revenues under Dominican management of custom-houses were $1,850,000; the proposed budget for current admin istration was $1,300,000, leaving only $550,000 to pay foreign and liquidated obligations, and pay ments on these latter will amount during the ensu ing year to $1,700,000, besides $900,000 of arrear ages of payments overdue, amounting in all to $2,600,000. It is therefore impossible under exist- ing conditions, which are chronic, and with the estimated yearly revenues of the Republic, which during the last decade have averaged approximately $1,600,000, to defray the ordinary expenses of the Government and to meet its obligations. The Dominican debt owed to European creditors is about $22,000,000, and of this sum over $18,000,000 is more or less formally recognized. The rep resentatives of European Governments have several times approached the Secretary of State setting forth the wrongs and intolerable delays to which they have been subjected at the hands of the suc cessive Governments of Santo Domingo in the col lection of their just claims, and intimating that unless the Dominican Government should receive some assistance from the United States in the way of regulating its finances, the creditor Governments in Europe would be forced to resort to more effec tive measures of compulsion to secure the satisfac tion of their claims. If the United States Government declines to take action and other foreign Governments resort to ac tion to secure payment of their claims, the latter would be entitled, according to the decision of The Hague tribunal in the Venezuelan cases, to the pref erential payment of their claims; and this would absorb all the Dominican revenues and would be a virtual sacrifice of American claims and interests in the island. If moreover, any such action should be taken by them, the only method to enable them to secure the payment of their claims would be to take possession of the custom-houses, and consider ing the state of the Dominican finances this would mean a definite and very possibly permanent occu pation of Dominican territory, for no period could be set to the time which would be necessarily re quired for the payment of their obligations and un liquidated claims. The United States Government could not interfere to prevent such seizure and oc cupation of Dominican territory without either itself proposing some feasible alternative in the way of action, or else virtually saying to European Gov ernments that they would not be allowed to collect their claims. This would be an unfortunate atti tude for the Government of the United States to be forced to maintain at present. It can not with pro priety say that it will protect its own citizens and interests, on the one hand, and yet on the other hand refuse to allow other Governments to protect their citizens and interests. The actual situation in the Dominican Republic can not, perhaps, be more forcibly stated than by giving a brief account of the case of the Santo Domingo Improvement Company. From 1869 to 1897 the Dominican Government issued successive series of bonds, the majority of which were in the hands of European holders. Suc cessive issues bore interest at rates ranging from 2% to 6 per cent, and what with commissions and other deductions and the heavy discount in the market the Government probably did not receive over 50 to 75 per cent of their nominal value. Other portions of the debt were created by loans, for which the Government received only one-half of the amount it was nominally to repay, and these obligations bore interest at the rate if i to 2 per cent a month on their face, some of them com pounded monthly. The improvidence of the Government in its finan cial management was due to its weakness, to its impaired credit, and to its pecuniary needs occa sioned by frequent insurrections and revolutionary changes, and by its inability to collect its revenues. In 1888 the Government, in order to secure the payment of an issue of bonds, placed the custom houses and the collection of its customs duties, which are substantially the only revenues of the Republic, in the hands of the Westendorps, bankers of Amsterdam, Holland. But the national debt continued to grow and the Government finally in trusted the collection of its revenues to an American corporation, the Santo Domingo Improvement Com pany, which was to take over the bonds of the Westendorps. The Dominican Government finally became dissatisfied with this arrangement, and, in 1901, ousted the Improvement Company from its custom-houses and took into its own hands the col lection of its revenues. The company thereupon ap pealed to the United States Government to maintain them in their position, but their request was refused. The Dominican Government then sent its minister of foreign affairs to Washington to negotiate a settlement. He admitted that the Improvement Company had equities which ought not to be disregarded, and the Department of State suggested that the Dominican Government and the Improve ment Company should effect, by private negoti ation, a satisfactory settlement between them. They accordingly entered into an arrangement for a set tlement, which was mutually satisfactory to the parties. A similar arrangement was likewise made between the Dominican Government and the Euro pean bondholders. The latter arrangement was carried into execution by the Dominican Govern ment and payments made toward the liquidation of the bonds held by the European holders. The Do minican Congress refused to ratify the similar arrangement made with the Improvement Com pany, and the Government refused to provide for the payment of the American claimants. In this state of the case it was evident that a continuance of this treatment of the American creditors, and its repetition in other cases, would, if allowed to run its course, result in handing over the island to European creditors, and in time would ripen into serious controversies between the United States and other Governments, unless the United States should deliberately and finally abandon its interests in the island. The Improvement Company and its allied com panies held, besides bonds, certain banking and railway interests in the island. The Dominican Government, desirous to own and possess these properties, agreed with the companies that the value of their bonds and properties was $4,500,000, and they submitted to arbitration the question as to the instalments in which this sum should be paid and the security that should be given. The Hon. George Gray, judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Hon. Manuel de J. Galvan, both named by the Dominican Republic, and the Hon. John G. Carlisle, named by the United States, were the arbitrators, and rendered their award on July 14, 1904. By its terms the Dominican Government was to pay the above-mentioned sum of $4,500,000, with 4 per cent interest per annum, in monthly in stalments of $37,500 each during two years and of $41,666.66 each month thereafter, beginning with the month of September, 1904, said award to be se cured by the customs revenues and port dues of all the ports on the northern coast of Santo Domingo, The award further provides for the appointment of a financial agent of the United States, who was author ized, in case of failure during any month to receive the sum then due, to enter into possession of the custom-house at Puerto Plata in the first instance and assume charge of the collection of customs duties and port dues, and to fix and determine these duties and dues and secure their payment; in case the sums collected at Puerto Plata should at any time be insufficient for the payment of the amounts due under the award, or in case of any other mani fest necessity, or in case the Dominican Government should so request, the financial agent of the United States was authorized to have and exercise at any and all of the other ports above described all the rights and powers vested in him by the award in respect of Puerto Plata. Under the award the financial agent could only apply the revenues col lected toward its payment after he had first paid the expenses of collection and certain other obli gations styled "aparods," which constituted prior charges on the revenues assigned. These prior charges are specified in the award. The Dominican Government defaulted in their payments; and in virtue of the award and the authority conferred by the Dominican Government, and at its request, pos session was delivered of the custom-house of Puerto Plata to the fiscal agent appointed by the United States to collect the revenues assigned by the arbi trators for the payment of the award ; and in virtue of the same authority possession of the custom-house of Monte Cristi has also been handed over. I submit herewith a report of Mr. John B. Moore, agent of the United States in this case, and a copy of the award of the arbitrators. During the past two years the European claim ants except the English, whose interests were em braced in those of the American companies, have, with the support of their respective Governments, been growing more and more importunate in pressing their unsatisfied demands. The French and the Belgians, in 1901, had entered into a con tract with the Dominican Government, but, after a few payments were made on account, it fell into neglect. Other Governments also obliged the Do minican Government to enter into arrangements of various kinds by which the revenues of the Re public were in large part sequestrated, and under one of the agreements, which was concluded with Italy in 1903, the minister of that Government was empowered directly to collect from the importers and exporters that portion of the customs revenues assigned to him as security. As the result of chronic disorders attended with a constant increase of debt, the state of things in Santo Domingo has become hopeless, unless the United States or some other strong Government shall interpose to bring order out of the chaos. The custom-houses, with the exception of the two in the possession of the financial agent appointed by the United States, have become unproductive for the discharge of indebted ness, except as to persons making emergency loans to the Government or to its enemies for the purpose of carrying on political contests by force. They have, in fact, become the nuclei of the various revo lutions. The first effort of revolutionists is to take possession of a custom-house so as to obtain funds, which are then disposed of at the absolute discre tion of those who are collecting them. The chronic disorders prevailing in Santo Domingo have, more over, become exceedingly dangerous to the interests of Americans holding property in that country. Constant complaints have been received of the in juries and inconveniences to which they have been subjected. As an evidence of the increasing aggra vation of conditions, the fact may be mentioned that about a year ago the American railway, which had previously been exempt from such attacks, was seized, its tracks torn up, and a station destroyed by revolutionary bands. The ordinary resources of diplomacy and inter national arbitration are absolutely impotent to deal wisely and effectively with the situation in the Dominican Republic, which can only be met by organizing its finances on a sound basis and by placing the custom-houses beyond the temptation of insurgent chieftains. Either we must abandon our duty under our traditional policy toward the Dominican people, who aspire to a republican form of government while they are actually drifting into a condition of permanent anarchy, in which case we must permit some other Government to adopt its own measures in order to safeguard its own interests, or else we must ourselves take seasonable and appropriate action. Again and again has the Dominican Government invoked on its own behalf the aid of the United States. It has repeatedly done so of recent years. In 1899 it sought to enter into treaty relations by which it would be placed under the protection of the United States Government. The request was refused. Again in January, 1904, its minister of foreign affairs visited Washington and besought the help of the United States Government to en able it to escape from its financial and social dis orders. Compliance with this request was again declined, for this Government has been most re luctant to interfere in any way, and has finally con cluded to take action only because it has become evident that failure to do so may result in a situation fraught with grave danger to the cause of inter national peace. In 1903 a representative of a foreign Government proposed to the United States the joint fiscal con trol of the Dominican Republic by certain creditor nations, and that the latter should take charge of the custom-houses and revenues and give to the Dominican Government a certain percentage and apply the residue to the payment ratably of claims of foreign creditors. The United States Govern ment declined to approve or to enter into such an arrangement. But it has now become evident that decided action of some kind can not be much longer delayed. In view of our past experience and our knowledge of the actual situation of the Dominican Republic, a definite refusal of the United States Government to take any effective action looking to the relief of the Dominican Republic and to the discharge of its own duty under the Monroe Doctrine can only be considered as an acquiescence in some such action by another Government. That most wise measure of international states manship, the Platt amendment, has provided a method for preventing such difficulties from arising in the new Republic of Cuba. In accordance with the terms of this amendment the Republic of Cuba can not issue any bonds which can be collected from Cuba save as a matter of grace, unless with the con sent of the United States, which is at liberty at all times to take measures to prevent the violation of the letter and spirit of the Platt amendment. If a similar plan could now be entered upon by the Dominican Republic, it would undoubtedly be of great advantage to them and to all other peoples, for under such an arrangement no larger debt would be incurred than could be honestly paid, and those who took debts not thus authorized would, by the mere fact of taking them, put themselves in the category of speculators or gamblers, who deserved no consideration and who would be permitted to receive none; so that the honest creditor would on the one hand be safe, while on the other hand the Republic would be safeguarded against molestation in the interest of mere speculators. But no such plan at present exists; and under existing circumstances, when the condition of af fairs becomes such as it has become in Santo Do mingo, either we must submit to the likelihood of infringement of the Monroe Doctrine or we must ourselves agree to some such arrangement as that herewith submitted to the Senate. In this case, for tunately, the prudent and far-seeing statesmanship of the Dominican Government has relieved us of all trouble. At their request we have entered into the agreement herewith submitted. Under it the cus tom-houses will be administered peacefully, honestly, and economically, 45 per cent of the proceeds being turned over to the Dominican Government and the remainder being used by the United States to pay what proportion of the debts it is possible to pay on an equitable basis. The Republic will be secured against over-seas aggression. This in reality en tails no new obligation upon us, for the Monroe Doctrine means precisely such a guarantee on our part. It is perhaps unnecessary to state that no step of any kind has been taken by the Administration under the terms of the protocol which is herewith submitted. The Republic of Santo Domingo has by this protocol wisely and patriotically accepted the re sponsibilities as well as the privileges of liberty, and is showing with evident good faith its purpose to pay all that its resources will permit of its obliga tions. More than this it can not do, and when it has done this we should not permit it to be molested. We on our part are simply performing in peaceful manner, not only with the cordial acquiescence, but in accordance with the earnest request of the Government concerned, part of that international duty which is necessarily involved in the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine. We are bound to show that we perform this duty in good faith and with out any intention of aggrandizing ourselves at the expense of our weaker neighbors or of conducting ourselves otherwise than so as to benefit both these weaker neighbors and those European Powers which may be brought into contact with them. It is in the highest degree necessary that we should prove by our action that the world may trust in our good faith and may understand that this in ternational duty will be performed by us within our own sphere, in the interest not merely of our selves, but of all other nations, and with strict justice toward all. If this is done a general ac ceptance of the Monroe Doctrine will in the end surely follow; and this will mean an increase of the sphere in which peaceful measures for the set tlement of international difficulties gradually dis place those of a warlike character. We can point with just pride to what we have clone in Cuba as a guaranty of our good faith. We stayed in Cuba only so long as to start her aright on the road to self-government, which she has since trod with such marked and distinguished success; and upon leaving the island we exacted no conditions save such as would prevent her from ever becoming the prey of the stranger. Our pur pose in Santo Domingo is as beneficent. The good that this country got from its action in Cuba was indirect rather than direct. So it is as regards Santo Domingo. The chief material advantage that will come from the action proposed to be taken will be to Santo Domingo itself and to Santo Domingo s creditors. The advantages that will come to the United States will be indirect, but nevertheless great, for it is supremely to our in terest that all the communities immediately south of us should be or become prosperous and stable, and therefore not merely in name but in fact in dependent and self-governing. I call attention to the urgent need of prompt action on this matter. We now have a great op portunity to secure peace and stability in the isl and, without friction or bloodshed, by acting in accordance with the cordial invitation of the gov ernmental authorities themselves. It will be un fortunate from every standpoint if we fail to grasp this opportunity; for such failure will probably mean increasing revolutionary violence in Santo Domingo, and very possibly embarrassing foreign complications in addition. This protocol affords a practical test of the efficiency of the United States Government in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. WHITE HOUSE, February 75, 1905.